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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 10-1586 
_________ 
 
 
BILLIE JO RICHARDS, 
                                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CENTRE AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4-08-cv-01947) 
District Judge:  Honorable James F. McClure 
 _________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 14, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed : February 18, 201 ) 
______ 
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______ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 In this employment discrimination case, Appellant Billie Jo Richards appeals the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Centre Area Transportation 
Authority (“CATA”).  We will affirm.1   
 Richards worked as a bus operator with CATA from October 1989 until June 
2007.  Her time at CATA was tumultuous.  In 2001, Richards filed a sexual harassment 
claim against her supervisor, which was ultimately dismissed on May 17, 2007.  Richards 
was disciplined on several occasions for inappropriate conduct, including oral outbursts 
against her co-workers and customers, workplace threats, and inappropriate comments 
over the radio.  Due to escalated incidents that occurred on May 22 and 23, 2007, CATA 
placed Richards on non-disciplinary suspension with pay pending completion of an 
investigation in compliance with its Collective Bargaining Agreement.  On May 24, the 
day before the suspension took effect, Richards notified CATA’s in-house counsel that 
she intended to file a sexual harassment claim in federal court.  She filed the complaint 
on May 31.  On June 6, 2007, CATA terminated Richards’ employment following 
completion of the investigation. 
 In October 2008, after exhausting her administrative remedies, Richards filed the 
underlying complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania against CATA alleging unlawful retaliation based on her filing a complaint 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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in federal court against CATA for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and similar provisions of the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. 
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of CATA.  The District 
Court first considered whether Richards established a prima facie case of retaliation.  See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (setting forth the 
burden shifting stages in an employment discrimination claim); Moore v. City of Phila., 
461 F.3d 331, 346 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas approach to retaliation 
claim).  The parties did not dispute that Richards engaged in a protected employee 
activity (i.e., filing a harassment suit) at or before CATA took an adverse employment 
action, thus satisfying the first two elements of a prima facie claim.  See Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (setting forth the elements to 
establish a prima facie case).  With respect to the disputed third element, the District 
Court found that “the proximity between Richards’ filing of her federal complaint and her 
employment termination is sufficient to establish causation for the purposes of 
establishing a prima facie case in a retaliation action.”  App. Vol. I at 18.  As such, the 
Court found that Richards met her initial burden. 
 Second, the District Court considered whether CATA met its burden to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.  The Court reviewed the record: 
“CATA has pointed to a number of disciplinary actions which it contends formed the 
basis for its decision,” in particular “several events that occurred in April and May of 
4 
 
2007 [prior to initiation of the lawsuit and termination] involving profane language, 
inappropriate conduct toward a bus rider while Richards was on the job, and threatening 
conduct toward a co-worker.”  App. Vol. I at 19.  As such, the Court found that CATA 
met its burden at the second stage. 
 With regard to the third and final burden shifting stage, the District Court 
considered whether Richards proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by CATA are not true but instead a mere pretext for 
discrimination.  The District Court concluded that Richards failed to substantiate her 
claim that the investigative procedures leading up to her termination were inadequate 
because she failed to cite to any evidence in the record in support of her contention.  And, 
“more importantly,” the Court held that Richards’ attacks on CATA’s investigatory 
process do not create a genuine issue of material fact given the documentation in the 
record: CATA’s investigation “took roughly two weeks . . . with [the Assistant Director 
of Transportation] interviewing a number of individuals, following up with leads, and 
documenting the decisional process.”  App. Vol. I. 24-25.  Finally, the District Court 
concluded that even if the investigation were faulty or the conclusions erroneous, this 
alone “fail[s] to show any improper mens rea on the part of CATA; at most, the facts 
indicate that CATA was mistaken or that CATA potentially could have engaged in a 
more thorough investigation.”  App. Vol. I. at 26.  Accordingly, the Court found Richards 
failed to meet her burden at the third stage and granted summary judgment in favor of 
CATA. 
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 Our standard of review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is 
plenary.  McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  The only argument 
advanced by Richards on appeal is that she has indeed established a prima facie case of 
retaliation given the temporal proximity of the filing of her complaint and employment 
termination.  Even if Richards established a prima facie case, we agree with the District 
Court that she advances no argument and points to nothing in the record “that would 
support an inference that the reasons proffered by CATA were pretext.”  App. Vol. I. at 
26.  
 For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant. 
